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LAND USE PLANNING: FINANCIAL SAVIOR OR SOCIAL VILLAIN
THE BITTERSWEET IMPACT FEE IS BORN IN FLORIDA

-

Contractors&Builders Associationv. City of Dunedin, 829 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976)
In order to finance the future capital expansion of its water and sewage
treatment and distribution facilities, the city of Dunedin passed ordinances
imposing impact charges on each new connection to its water and sewer
systems.' Plaintiffs, an association of building contractors,2 brought suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against the imposition of the charges,3 alleging
the funds so collected constituted taxes that a municipality is forbidden to
impose in the absence of enabling legislation. 4 The circuit court found the
ordinance an ultra vires attempt to impose taxes. 5 On appeal, the Second
District Court of Appeal reversed, 6 certifying its decision to the supreme
court as a question of "great public interest."' The Supreme Court of Florida
HELD, a municipality may impose user fees for purposes of capital expansion
of public facilities provided the funds are not excessive and are used within
the same municipal department s in which they are collected.9
Rapid population growth, once considered a blessing, is now creating
serious problems for many Florida communities. As population increases,
existing public services and facilities become overloaded and new ones must
1. The ordinance states: "In addition to the meter installation charges described
herein, there shall be paid an assessment to defray the cost of production, distribution,
transmission, and treatment facilities for water and sewer provided at the expense of the
City of Dunedin, as follows:
$325.00
Each dwelling unit; for water
475.00
for sewer
150.00
Each transient unit; for water
275.00
for sewer
325.00
Each business unit; for water
475.00
for sewer
DUNEDIN, FLA., CODE §25-71(c) as cited in Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin,
329 So. 2d 314, 317 n.1 (Fla. 1976).
2. As building contractors, plaintiffs could not assert new residents' claims that the
ordinance infringed on their right to travel or violated the equal protection clause.
See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). The
Second District Court of Appeal found the ordinance did not discriminate against newcomers in any event since both old and new residents connecting to the system must pay
the fee. City of Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n, 312 So. 2d 763, 767 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1975).
3. 312 So. 2d at 764.
4. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §1(a). See Belcher Oil Co. v. Dade County, 271 So. 2d 118 (Fla.
1972).
5. City of Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n, 312 So. 2d 763, 766 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1975) (the circuit court opinion was not reported).
6. Id. at 763.
7. Id. The case was certified June 10, 1975, pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, §3(b)(3).
8. Municipal department will be used to refer to any public service facility or utility
system operated by a municipality.
9. Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976). The
Dunedin ordinance was found defective, however, for failure to restrict explicitly the
use of the fees collected to improvement of the water and sewer system. Id. at 321.
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be built to meet increased demands. This expansion, traditionally financed
by municipal bond issues, has resulted in higher property taxes and utility
rates for Florida residents.10 In response, several cities have sought to shift
the costs of expansion to the new residents who create the need for the additional facilities.11

Florida municipalities are limited, however, in their ability to assess residents for funds. While, under the constitution, cities may exercise "any power
for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law," 12 Florida courts
have only recently acknowledged this provision as a grant of broad police
powers to local government. 13 In contrast, municipalities' taxing powers remain
strictly limited. In reserving its taxing powers, the state has expressly prohibited cities from imposing any taxes other than ad valorem property taxes
unless authorized by general law.14 There is no general law specifically
authorizing the imposition of impact fees, 15 nor is there any statute that

10. A comparison of per capita property taxes and expenditures for personal services
in several Florida cities for the years 1970 and 1973 follows:
Ft. Lauderdale Orlando
Tampa
Pensacola
Hialeah Jacksonville
Prop.
'70
53.64
41.03
46.91
12.79
19.23
49.00
tax
'73
85.20
57.42
47.32
21.15
35.22
61.85
Exp. Pers.
'70
99.65
135.76
76.54
81.07
36.91
92.94
Serv.
'73
131.00
220.36
82.65
116.28
71.82
169.82
The sharp rise in per capita expenditures for personal services is clearly responsible in part
for the per capita increase in property taxes. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Crry Gov'T FINS.
Table 5 (1969-1970); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Crry Gov'r FINS. TABLE 5 (1973-1974).
II. See, e.g., Broward County v. Janis Development Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (4th D.CA.
Fla. 1975); Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (17th Cir. Ct.
1973). See also Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 28 U.2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972).
12. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §2(b).
13. The Florida constitution of 1855 granted cities only those powers enumerated
in their charters and specifically provided by law. In 1968 the new Florida constitution,
seeking to give cities more freedom to resolve local problems, shifted the presumption of
validity to exercises of power by municipalities in art. VIII, §2(b). Nevertheless, the Florida
supreme court was slow to accept this expansion of municipal powers. In City of Miami
Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972), the court struck down a rent
control ordinance as beyond the scope of municipal powers, stating the paramount
law of a municipality is its charter. In response, the 1973 Florida legislature enacted
the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, FLA. STAT. §166.011 (1975), which repeats the
constitutional provision that cities "may exercise any power for municipal purposes except
when prohibited by law." The supreme court deferred to the explicit legislative intent,
upholding the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act and acknowledging the expansion
of municipal powers in City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla.

1974).
14. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §1(a) reads: "No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of
the law. No state ad valorem taxes shall be levied upon real estate or tangible personal
property. All other forms of taxation shall be preempted to the state except as provided
by general law." See also FLA. CONsT. art. VII, §9; Tampa v. Birdsong Motors, Inc., 261
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
15. Several bills that would have specifically authorized municipalities to impose
impact fees have been introduced in the Florida legislature but have died in committee.
See, e.g., Fla. H.R. 837 (Reg. Sess. 1975, introduced by Rep. Boyd).
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can be interpreted to imply such authorization. 6 Therefore, to be upheld,

the charges must emanate from the exercise of municipal police powers.
There is no doubt that cities have not only the power to provide municipal
services17 but also the concurrent power to construct, maintain, and operate
the necessary facilities. S Municipal authority to charge residents for
maintenance and expansion of these services is limited only by such constitu-

tional guarantees as due process 20 and equal protection 1 and statutory require22
ments that such rates and charges be "just and equitable."
Prior to the instant decision, it was unclear to what extent a city could
impose charges for future capital improvements within the scope of its police
powers" without invading the taxing powers reserved by the state. 24 Earlier
charges were challenged as arbitrary in application, 5 or excessive,2 6 or unconstitutional.27 Although the extent of municipal police power vis-a-vis the
taxing power was at issue in two recent cases, the courts failed to articulate
any precise limits.28
In Broward County v. Janis Development Corp.,29 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal considered an impact charge to be a tax when it was
collected for use in the construction of new roads and bridges and imposed
as a condition to the issuance of a building permit.3 0 Noting that the city

anticipated the collection of approximately six million dollars in the first
year,3 ' the court found it "impossible that such revenue could approximate
16. The charges in the instant case were not special assessments as authorized by FL&.
§170.01 (1975). Assessments are levied directly against the property benefited by the
improvement in proportion to the benefits derived and are charged to all owners of
property in the assessed area. Since the charges imposed by the city of Dunedin were for
the use of water and sewer facilities, the property owner who did not use the facilities
was not required to pay the impact fee. The burden on a public facility, not the benefit
to property, is the basis for impact fees.
17. Fr. CONST. art. VIII, §2(b) states: "Municipalities shall have the power . . . to
perform municipal functions and render municipal services."
18. Cooksey v. Utilities Comm'n, 261 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1972).
19. See, e.g., State v. City of Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6 (1933) (the supreme
court upheld utility rates set high enough to finance operation of the system and repayment of a bond issue. In so ruling, the court recognized expansion as a valid element in
utility charges). Accord, Hartman v. Aurora Sanitary Dist., 23 Il1. 2d 109, 177 N.E.2d 214
(1961).
20. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, §1; FrA. CoNsr. art. I, §9.
21. U.S. CON.T. amend. XIV, §1; FLA. CONsr. art. I, §2.
22. FLA. SrAT. §180.13(2) (1975).
23. See note 13 supra.
24. See note 14 supra.
25. Pinellas Apartment Ass'n v. City of St. Petersburg, 294 So. 2d 676 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
STAT.

1974).
26. Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371, 375 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
27. Cooksey v. Utilities Comm'n, 261 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1972).
28. Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975);
Venditti-Siravo v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (17th Cir. Ct. 1973).
29. 311 So. 2d 371 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975).

30. Id.-at 375.
31. Id.
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any cost of regulation."32 In addition, the Janis court faulted the ordinance
for failure to specify where and when the funds were to be spent for the
roads.33 Although the charges collected were to be placed in special trust
funds3 4 and were to be spent only on roads serving the vicinity of the
project in which the charges were collected,3 5 land other than that on which
the charges were imposed would likely receive benefit from the road construction and some land subject to charges might receive no benefit. The court
viewed the charge as resembling a general revenue measure and, it was deemed
to be a tax.
Similarly, a circuit court in Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywoodstruck down a charge of one percent of the cost of construction collected
at the issuance of a building permit for use in the construction of neighborhood parks.3 7 The court held that the charge was unconstitutional because
its operation worked to discriminate unlawfully against the plaintiff class.3 As
an additional ground for disapproving the charge, the court summarily labeled
it a tax. 5
In the instant decision the supreme court delineated the extent to which
municipalities can, within the scope of their police powers, impose charges
on their residents for future capital improvements. Under the new rule, a
charge collected for capital improvements to be made within the same
municipal department40 imposing the charge, and not excessive for that purpose, is a valid exercise of police powers41 and constitutes a fee rather than a
tax.

42

32. Id. The court was apparently convinced that these fees were exacted "solely for
revenue purposes" rather than for a regulatory purpose. Id. See Bateman v. City of
Winter Park, 160 Fla. 906, 37 So. 2d 362 (1948).
33. 311 So. 2d at 375.
34. Broward County, Fla., Ordinance 73-2, §6, May 7, 1973.
35. Id. §5.
36. 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (17th Cir. Ct. 1973).
37. Id. at 122.
38. Id. The court did not explain its rationale for finding the charges arbitrary,
partial, and discriminatory.
39. Id. at 123.
40. See note 8 supra.
41. 329 So. 2d at 318. The court reasoned that the charges imposed in Janis and VendittiSiravo would have been analogous to those in the instant case if they "had been used
to underwrite the administrative costs of issuing building permits, or . . . in enforcing
the building code," or had been designated for future outlay such as the "acquisition of
automobiles for building inspectors." Thus, use of the funds within the collecting
service is essential. Note that the charges imposed in Janis and Venditti-Siravo were paid
as prerequisites to the issuance of building permits. Id. DUNEDIN, FLA., CODE §25-71(d) provides that the charges in the instant case are payable at the time a building permit is
obtained. Such payment need not be made in order to obtain a building permit, however.
The time of payment coincides with the time of permit issuance merely for convenience
since payment is a prerequisite to connection to the water and sewer system. Id. at 316-17.
42. 329 So. 2d at 318. The court purported to follow numerous cases as precedent in
concluding that the instant charges were fees. None of these cases, however, were decided
on the criteria here enunciated by the Florida supreme court. Hartman v. Aurora Sanitary
Dist., 23 Ill. 2d 109, 177 N.E.2d 214 (1961) (sewer connection charges were deemed fees
because of their nonmandatory nature; the funds collected were not limited to use within
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Utility charges are also required by statute to be "just and equitable."4 8 An
ordinance imposing utility charges to defray the costs of capital expansion
must meet three more criteria to satisfy this statutory requirement.- First, it
must be shown that expansion is reasonably required. 45 Second, the charges
cannot exceed a pro rata share of the anticipated costs of expansion.46 Finally,
the use of the funds must be expressly limited to meeting the costs of expansion.4 7 The Dunedin ordinance was found defective for failure to include
on its face the necessary restrictions on the use of the funds even though
such restrictions existed in fact.48
The instant court established the crucial criteria for distinguishing between a valid exercise of police power and an intrusion on taxing powers. The
imposition of an impact fee is a lawful exercise of police power if the funds
are used internally within the municipal department collecting the charge
and if the charge is not excessive. This test not only encompasses the objections found by the Janis court regarding the excessive nature of some fees
but also assures that those burdening a particular facility pay for and benefit
from its expansion.
Approving the use of impact fees,4 9 the supreme court apparently
recognized the difference between a "special assessment" on property
specifically benefited by the improvement and an "impact fee" related to the
burden placed on a public facility.5 0 Under the fee in the instant case, old
and new residents alike must pay when a new connection is made, but the

the sewer system); City of North Muskegon v. Boleman Constr. Co., 335 Mich. 520, 56
N.W.2d 371 (1953) (charge imposed to retire bonds not for direct finance of future
expansion); Maryville v. Cushman, 363 Mo. 87, 249 S.W.2d 347 (1952) (charge imposed
to retire bonds not to finance capital improvement); State ex tel. Gordon v. Taylor,
149 Ohio 427, 79 N.E.2d 127 (1948) (regular monthly user charge applied to tax exempt
university); Chastain v. Oklahoma City, 208 Okla. 604, 258 P.2d 635 (1953) (regular user
charge).
43. FLA. STAT. §180.13(2) (1975).
44. 329 So. 2d 319-20. The court also discussed several criteria that need not be present

for a charge to be "just and equitable." Charges need not be limited to maintenance costs
alone and may be used for capital requirements. Id. at 320. Nor must charges be uniform.
Differential rates determined by the character of the user, i.e., residential, business, etc.,
are not inequitable. Id.
45. Id.
46. id.
47. Id. "[1it is not 'just and equitable' to impose the entire burden of capital expenditures, including replacement of existing plant, on persons connecting to a water and
sewer system after an arbitrarily chosen time certain." Id. Although earmarked for expansion, it is apparent that the monies collected must be restricted in the ordinance to
use for expansion and improvement to insure its validity.
48. The supreme court acknowledged that Dunedin city officials had in fact limited
the use of the monies collected under the ordinance to the expansion of the water and
sewer system. The court feared that future officials might not act so prudently; therefore,
the court required that the limitation be written into the ordinance.
49. "In principle however we see nothing wrong with transferring to the new user of

a municipally owned water or sewer system a fair share of the costs new use of the
system involves." 329 So. 2d at 317-18.
50. See note 16 supra.
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former can recoup this loss in the increased resale value of their previous
residences.61 Thus, new residents anywhere in the city are paying for the
expansion that they require. In contrast, under special assessments, once a
land area is shown to benefit specially from an improvement, all owners of
property therein must pay [or the improvement.5 2 Old residents who purchase
property within the assessed area cannot recover the amount of the charge in
the sale of their old homes, which are outside the assessed area.53
While the scope of the instant decision clearly encompasses municipal
utilities such as water, sewer, and electricity, other public services and facilities
could meet the standards enunciated by the court.- Public libraries are one
example. Requiring each new family seeking to obtain a library card to pay
a nonexcessive pro rata fee that could be used only for the necessary expansion
of the library would appear to be a valid exercise of police power under the
rationale of the instant case. Both old and new residents seeking to use the
facility for the first time would be required to pay for the increased burden
on the facility. 55 In this example, however, an old resident could not shift

his loss to a newcomer; therefore, the essential purpose of the impact fee is
not satisfied.
The enactment of impact charges to discourage growth may prove to be
self-defeating. If only 1, 2, or even 10 cities imposed such fees, growth would
be slowed in those cities. With the success of such fees, however, it is likely
that many municipalities would adopt such charges in the near future, which
would minimize the effect on growth from out-of-state newcomers as initial
moving costs increased uniformly. While impact on overall growth would be
de minimis, the impact on Florida residents seeking to move to a new
municipality would be great. Having paid charges for the use of one city's
facilities, many would be discouraged from moving to a new home outside the
city boundary by the burden of paying impact charges again. 5G

51. The resale value of a home already connected to the water and sewer system should
increase by the amount of the charge for new connections. The purchaser of the old
home absorbs the expense of the connection charge incurred by the old resident moving
to a new home.
52. See note 16 supra.
53. The special assessment is levied on specific property. It does not increase the
value of other property not benefited by the improvement. Since resale value of a home
outside the assessed area would not increase, the old resident moving into the assessed
area could not shift the expense of the improvement to his old property.
54. Public swimming pools, tennis courts, libraries, and perhaps garbage collection
services are a few examples that might come under the scope of the instant decision.
55. This equality of application should defeat any constitutional attack on the validity
of the ordinance made by new residents. See note 2 supra.
56. A person who moves from one city to another can recoup his impact fee expenditures
if the charges are imposed on mandatory facilities such as water and sewer systems. See
note 51 supra and accompanying text. The charge is shifted through displacement to the
purchaser of the vacating resident's home. The chain continues until the purchaser is one
who is new to the homeowner class in the area. If the charge is imposed on a nonmandatory
facility, however, there is no displacement or loss shifting. While subscription to such
typically nonmandatory facilities as libraries is not attached to saleable property, this is
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The test set down in the instant case dearly articulates for the first time
what charges a city may impose within the scope of its recently expanded
police powers. If there are faults in the instant decision, they exist not
in the court's reasoning but in the breadth of its ruling. The test in the
instant case appears to prevent all forseeable abuses of the municipal power
to impose impact fees. By failing to limit the scope of the test to mandatory
services and facilities, the court may have obscured the essential nature of
the impact charge. The additional burden on a mandatory facility can
accurately be measured by new applications for service.5 7 Absent the possibility
of displacement, the additional burden imposed by a new subscriber to a
nonmandatory facility can never be precisely determined. In addition, the
nonmandatory facility charges present recoupment problems for the Florida
resident who seeks to move across city boundaries. The decision in the
instant case is well-reasoned and comprehensive, however, its application
should be limited to mandatory facilities.
Lo i ToFFLEmiRE

not the critical distinction. If library subscription were mandatory for all families, refunds
could easily be made to those no longer in the city. When the facility is not mandatory,
refunds are impractical since there is no accurate record of when a person stops using the
services of a facility permanently.
57. See note 56 supra.
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